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Abstract
This article applies a game-theoretical analy-
sis of institutions to the international institu-
tional architecture, of which the G20 is treated
as a central element. The article argues that
international institutions such as the World
Trade Organization or the International Mon-
etary Fund are best understood as mechanisms
for coordinating and supporting equilibria in
repeated games played among policy-makers
in the world’s largest economies. The growth
of the emerging economies, particularly in
Asia, has altered these games, and there is no
guarantee, with these new entrants and new
issues that have emerged, that the old equilib-
rium strategies are still viable. The G20, it is
argued, is best understood as an attempt to
respond to this change and coordinate play on
a new set of globally welfare-enhancing equi-
libria in these games.
Key words: International economic coopera-
tion, G20, Asia, institutions, game theory
1. Introduction
The past three quarters of a century has seen
the growth and development of a set of what
might be termed international economic
institutions—the Bretton Woods institutions,
the G7 and more recently the G20. The func-
tion of these institutions is, loosely speaking,
to encourage and support economic policies at
the national level that will lead to greater
welfare globally than if policies were chosen
in isolation. There is little about these institu-
tions, however, that has been entirely without
controversy. The way countries are chosen for
inclusion in different groups, their governance,
the choice of agenda priorities are among some
of the areas that occasion most debate.
The past two decades have also seen devel-
opment of the study of institutions within
economics—what they are, why and how they
evolve and how they are sustained. These theo-
retical advances have been fruitfully applied to
explain the workings of various formal and
informal institutions, especially in the context
of economic development. Yet no serious
effort has, to our knowledge, been made to
apply these theories to the study of interna-
tional economic institutions. This is surprising
given the debates that surround the modalities
and the effectiveness of international institu-
tions. Older work, including in the analysis in
the lead up to the establishment of what
became the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) process (Drysdale 1988), pre-
dates and anticipates the development of this
more recent theory. A clearer understanding of
what an institution is, how it operates, and of
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what it can and cannot do, would appear to be
an essential prerequisite to understanding the
purpose and value of international institutions,
especially those that are breaking new ground.
This article aims to go a way towards over-
coming this deficiency. Specifically, its inten-
tion is to use the game-theoretical analysis of
institutions developed in institutional econom-
ics to better understand the nature and role of
the various elements of the international insti-
tutional architecture, with the emergence of
the G20 at the centre of interest. It is argued
that the advantage of a game-theoretical
approach is that it focuses attention on the
pre-institutional games played between policy-
makers and identifies what equilibria exist in
these games. This in turn makes it clear where
international institutions might play a role in
coordinating play on Pareto-superior equilib-
ria, and where this is less likely to be possible.
Understanding current policy-making games is
particularly pressing, it will be argued, as the
rapid growth of Asian economies over the past
two decades represents a shock to play in these
games and raises questions about changes in
the structure of the current international insti-
tutional architecture.
The article is structured as follows. The next
section reviews the main elements of the
game-theoretic study of institutions and pro-
vides an example of how this approach may
fruitfully be applied to the study of interna-
tional institutions by considering the case
of trade and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). This forms the backdrop to the dis-
cussion, in the third section, of the G20’s spe-
cific role in the international institutional
architecture. The understanding of the role and
nature of the G20 aims to inform the discus-
sion, in a fourth section, of the activities to date
of international institutions and the G20 in
coordinating policy and the proposal of certain
future avenues for action. A fifth section
concludes.
2. Game Theory and International
Institutions
The rational choice study of institutions
can be divided into two complementary
approaches.2 The first views institutions as ‘the
rules of the game in a society, or more for-
mally, the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction’ (North 1990, p. 3).
Such rules are divided into formal rules,
including the law, and informal rules or norms.
Since institutions are, according to this view,
analogous to the various technological con-
straints subject to which economic agents
make decisions, much work within this para-
digm is directed at studying the selection, and
the efficiency, of different institutions. Some
have focused on political competition in the
selection of institutions (Olson 1982), while
others have argued for a form of natural selec-
tion; over time, more efficient forms of insti-
tutional organisation will outperform others
and replace them (Williamson 2000; Binmore
2005).
In identifying institutions and rules, this
approach draws out two salient features of an
institution. First, an institution is associated
with a behavioural regularity, one that might
not be expected if individuals were simply
maximising utility from material circum-
stances, subject only to technological con-
straints. Second, just as rules of a game are
known to all the players of a game, agents
generally know reliably what institutions exist
in their society and how individuals will
behave in the context of these institutions’
existing.
However, identifying rules with institutions,
while treating the enforcement of such rules as
exogenous, fails to explain why such regulari-
ties of behaviour persist or why rules are even
taken seriously in the first place. For a
behavioural regularity to emerge and persist, it
must be consistent with the incentives agents
face in their relevant social interactions. Defin-
ing institutions as rules, which agents simply
follow, obscures this. The second approach
therefore starts out from a description of social
interactions as games, making explicit the stra-
tegic interdependence between agents and the
mechanisms by which behavioural regularities
2. For a more detailed review of both approaches, see
Greif and Kingston (2011).
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are enforced. Any regularity that arises must be
part of equilibrium of the game under study.
A particularly important result in this
respect is the Folk Theorem. This states, in
essence, that in an indefinitely repeated game
played by sufficiently patient players, any
strategy profile for the repeated game that
yields average discounted per-period payoffs
that are a Pareto improvement on a Nash Equi-
librium of the one-shot game can be achieved
as a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium.3
Since the kinds of social interactions in which
institutions operate are repeated, the Folk
Theorem allows us to reconcile the require-
ment that behavioural regularities associated
with institutions must be self-enforcing and
the fact that many institutions lead to
behavioural regularities that appear inconsis-
tent with individual incentives, at least in
single interactions. One important limitation
of the various folk theorems, however, is that
they do not single out which of the often large
number of equilibria in the repeated game will
arise in actual play.
While the second approach is unified in
understanding institutions and behavioural
regularities as equilibrium phenomena, there
are different understandings of what an insti-
tution is. At one extreme, Calvert (1995) has
argued that an institution is nothing more than
a description of the aggregate behavioural
regularity that arises in equilibrium in certain
kinds of interactions. Tempering this view,
Greif (2006) focuses on the role of certain
‘institutional elements’ in helping coordinate
agents’ expectations of other agents’ play in
social interactions. We tend towards the latter
view—institutions are created to help over-
come the coordination problem created by the
fact that the Folk Theorem does not single out
one of the potentially infinite number of equi-
libria that are possible for a given repeated
game.
The game-theoretical understanding of
institutions thus provides a clear approach to
studying a given institution as described by
Greif and Kingston (2011).The analysis starts
from a description of an underlying repeated
game. This description should, if possible,
only include the primitive situation in which
the players find themselves, setting out the
technological and informational constraints in
the circumstances under study. Once this
primitive situation has been described, and
possible equilibria identified, the various insti-
tutions and other social constructs (jointly
referred to as ‘institutional elements’ in Greif’s
language) that exist to help coordinate on a
particular equilibrium, guide the formation of
expectations or even alter the payoffs of the
underlying game can in turn be studied with
reference to the original game.4
In considering international institutions,
then, the first step is to identify the underlying
games in the context of which such institutions
arise. The games that will be of interest are
policy-making games—games where policy-
makers of different countries must set domes-
tic policies in a context where their optimal
policies depend on the policies chosen by
policy-makers in other countries. One major
area of policy-making will presently be exam-
ined in this connection, to illustrate how the
analysis is to be conducted, namely trade
policy. Two further areas, macroeconomic
policy (fiscal and monetary policy) and climate
change policy will be discussed further below,
in relation to the G20.5 Within the present con-
ceptual framework, international policy coop-
eration is then understood as the attempt to
move to Pareto-superior equilibria in the
repeated policy-making games, often through
the creation and use of international institu-
tions to alter national policy-makers’ expecta-
tions about how their colleagues in other
countries will play in future rounds of the
game.
3. This is roughly the original version of the theorem
presented in Friedman (1971), while more sophisticated
versions (for example, Kandori 1992) allow for such com-
plications as changing partners over time and imperfect
information.
4. For a detailed example of such an analysis, see Greif’s
(2006) discussion of the ‘fundamental problem of
exchange’.
5. Other areas of policy-making could readily be identi-
fied, for example the regulation of financial markets, or
domestic tax policy, but they are not considered here, as
they present similar features to the three on which we shall
focus in the article.
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The strategic nature of trade policy, in par-
ticular the setting of tariffs, has long been
recognised. The formal nature of the one-shot
games being played by policy-makers has been
studied extensively, and is akin to an elaborate
prisoners’ dilemma. A basic version of this
interdependence arises when there is imperfect
international competition, and policy-makers
set tariffs to maximise domestic aggregate
surplus. In this kind of set-up, all countries will
impose positive tariffs, above the socially
optimal level of the tariff.6 This interdepen-
dence has also long been recognised by policy-
makers, if more informally. For this reason,
trade policy was one object of the first major
effort at international institution building, the
Bretton Woods institutions, which were estab-
lished as a result of American and European
policy-makers’ conviction that a lack of inter-
national policy coordination in the 1930s
helped deepen the great depression (Steil
2013). In the area of trade, this institution
building took the form of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), later
replaced by the WTO.
Within the context of the prisoners’
dilemma-type games frequently analysed in
international trade, it might be tempting to the
think of the WTO, or the GATT before it, as
performing a role analogous to the one which
might be attributed to the police and judiciary
within a society, namely changing the incen-
tives faced by players so that the outcome of
the prisoners’ dilemma that is Pareto superior
to the Nash equilibrium becomes an equilib-
rium. This view would be mistaken, as it does
not explain how the change in incentives that is
supposedly brought about is enforced.
Instead, the Folk Theorem provides the key
to understanding the role of the WTO within
the larger international regime that is the
liberal international trade regime. The game of
setting trade policy neatly satisfies almost all
the requirements of the Folk Theorem. Inter-
actions are certainly repeated, and the game
can safely be treated as continuing indefinitely.
Past actions (setting or refraining from sett-
ing tariffs) are readily observable. The only
requirement whose satisfaction might be open
to debate is that agents, in this case, policy-
makers, are sufficiently patient. The fact that a
large degree of tariff liberalisation has been
possible over the past half-century suggests,
however, that this requirement is at least par-
tially satisfied. The Folk Theorem thus guar-
antees that it is possible for policy-makers in
different countries to choose a strategy over
time where they will set tariffs at the Pareto-
optimal level (that is, low or no tariffs) but
punish countries that defect from the low-tariff
situation by retaliating and, for a time, setting
punitive tariffs against defectors.
It is noteworthy that this kind of strategy
almost exactly describes the way in which
defections from WTO liberalisation agree-
ments are treated under the WTO system.
Countries may bring a complaint under the
WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism. If the
policy that is the object of the complaint is
found to violate an existing WTO agreement,
the complainant is entitled to retaliate, in par-
ticular through the use of punitive tariffs or
other measures. It is this retaliation, or the
implicit threat of it, carried out by the WTO’s
members themselves, that supports WTO
agreements.
Two different WTO disputes illustrate this
line of reasoning. The first is the 30 per cent
tariff imposed by the US government on steel
products in March 2002 (DS248). The threat
of retaliatory measures from in particular the
European Union (EU), following a WTO
ruling that the tariffs violated WTO agree-
ments, led the US government to remove the
tariffs by December 2003. Contrast this with
the case of US subsidies to cotton farmers,
which were first the object of WTO proceed-
ings engaged by Brazil in September 2002
(DS268). After finding in Brazil’s favour, the
WTO gave Brazil the right to retaliate in
November 2009. Yet, at the time of writing,
Brazil has not taken any retaliatory measures,
so the dispute remains unsettled. The differ-
ence between these two situations lies not with
the WTO, which acted in the same manner, but
with the complainant countries. The willing-
ness and ability of countries whose producers
6. McMillan (1986) provides a detailed review of early
applications of game theory to international trade.
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are the object of discriminatory trade measures
to retaliate in a meaningful way is what fun-
damentally supports liberal trade rather than
the WTO acting independently.
The role of the WTO as an institution is
instead to be found elsewhere. In light of the
multiplicity of equilibria that exist in the
repeated game, the most important role of the
WTO is as a coordination device. The exis-
tence of a WTO agreement, complete with
specifications of the kind of actions that will
be carried out if the agreement is breached,
supports the formation of expectations for
policy-makers that they will be setting policy
in a context in which they can be confident
that liberal trade policies are prevalent and
illiberal trade policies will be punished. The
negotiation of new WTO agreements also sup-
ports the change from equilibria in which
certain goods are protected, to others, in
which they are not.
The second role of the WTO, and of its
dispute resolution body in particular, is to
make equilibria more stable. Given the fact
that WTO agreements allow for the imposition
of trade-restricting measures, under certain
conditions, there is potential for liberal-trade
equilibria to unravel if policy-makers in differ-
ent countries, the players of the game, take
different views on whether new trade-
restrictive policies are justified or not. This
might be thought of as the policy-makers
having differing information on whether vio-
lations of agreements have taken place. The
dispute resolution body thus effectively makes
it common knowledge to the players whether
or not a given restrictive policy is a violation of
existing agreements.
Trade policy arguably represents the area
of international policy-making where the
greatest success has been had in moving
from an inefficient equilibrium—generalised
protectionism—to a more-efficient one—the
current (relatively) liberal international trade
regime. The WTO, and the GATT before it, has
played an important role in this transition and
in the maintenance of the current regime. As
discussed in greater detail below, the regime is
currently under some challenge, as new (in the
sense of newly significant) players have joined
the game and new issues that connect com-
modity trade to services trade and investment
have emerged. But its past gains have so far
remained well entrenched.
3. The G20 in the International
Institutional Architecture
In the above analysis, we have identified an
international institution, the WTO, whose prin-
cipal role is to coordinate expectations in a
repeated international policy-making game so
that national policy-makers play the strategies
associated with an equilibrium that is Pareto
superior to at least some other possible
equilibria. We see a similar pattern in other
international policy-making games: the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) in the macro-
economic policy game and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in the climate policy game, as dis-
cussed later. What role does this leave for an
institution that purports to cover all these areas
of policy-making at the same time?
The genesis of the G20 is a tale of two
crises. The first—the Asian financial crisis—
led to the creation of the G20 as a meeting of
finance ministers and central bank governors
from 19 of the world’s largest economies plus
the EU. The second—the global financial
crisis—led then-US president George W. Bush
to elevate the G20 to a leaders’ level meeting.
This decision was accompanied by claims that
the G20 had replaced the G7 and was now the
pre-eminent forum for international economic
policy coordination.
Bush’s hand was forced by the dire circum-
stances in which the global economy found
itself in 2008. Consequently, the work of the
early G20 summits largely focused on averting
a deeper crisis, as opposed to international
institution building in the context of the types
of repeated games of interest here. But the
creation of the G20 is also the product of
longer term trends in the global economy. If
Bush had not elevated the G20 to the level of a
leaders’ forum in 2008, something similar may
well have been created in the following
decade.
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The old international institutions—the
WTO, the IMF, even the UNFCCC—were all
developed at a time when the world’s largest
economies were, with the exception of Japan,
European and North American. By 2008, the
G7 economies represented only 41 per cent of
the global economy, expressed at purchasing
power parity, as compared with 56 per cent in
1980 (IMF 2012a). The declining share of the
G7 economies was primarily the consequence
of the extraordinary rise of Asia over the past
three decades. China alone grew from 2
per cent of the global output to 12 per cent
over the same period. By 2012, China already
was nudging a 15 per cent share in world
output and will grow in importance over the
years ahead, a success mirrored or being mir-
rored, in the growth of South Korea, India and
Indonesia among other Asian economies.
The G20, on the other hand, represents 83
per cent of the global economy at purchasing
power parity (IMF 2012a), and 80 per cent of
world trade (IMF 2012b) at the time of writing.
In particular, the Asian G20 members7 repre-
sented 30 per cent of world output and 23
per cent of world trade in 2012 (IMF 2012b).
They held 46 per cent of total global currency
reserves in 2010 (World Bank 2012), and Asia
as a whole produced 35 per cent of global
output, as measured at purchasing power
parity, as compared with just under 20 per cent
in 1980 (IMF 2012a).8
The rapid growth of the Asian economies is
best understood as an exogenous shock in the
repeated policy-making games identified
above. Specifically, when the Asian countries’
economies were small, they could only respond
to policy choices made in large economies, as is
still the case in smaller economies, developed
or otherwise, today. Trade or macroeconomic
policy in these developing economies has little
effect on the developed economies; so, from the
perspective of policy-makers in the largest
developed economies at least, there was no
strategic interaction between themselves and
the developing economies, and thus little need
to closely involve the developing economies in
efforts to coordinate expectations through
various international institutions.
This is no longer the case, and policy in
large emerging economies is relevant, and will
become more relevant, to policy-makers in
advanced economies. However, at least in the
kinds of policy-making games considered in
this article, the large emerging economies are
not so different from the developed economies.
They often have the same policy options and
these often yield more or less the same payoffs
as for the advanced economies. In trade, for
example, the same protectionist tools are avail-
able to emerging economies’ policy-makers as
to policy-makers in developed ones, and quali-
tatively similar payoffs will follow from using
them or refraining from doing so. Likewise,
policy-makers in emerging economies like
those in advanced economies often face the
same domestic tradeoffs in deciding whether
to support their currencies or not, or whether
to embark on expansionary fiscal policy
or not.
One might therefore expect the coordination
devices in the old international institutions to
continue to function equally well as new
players with similar payoffs enter the policy-
making games. There is a view in emerging
economies, however, that these coordination
devices have tended to coordinate policy to the
advantage of the advanced countries, and the
disadvantage of developing ones. There is even
a view in some emerging economies that
advanced economies will not stick to policy
strategies that will see their relative economic
importance decline over time. This belief
helps explain, for example, Chinese cynicism
about US motives in promoting the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (George Mulgan 2013) at
the expense of the WTO. Emerging-economy
scepticism is not limited to trade, and affects all
the types of policy-making games mentioned
above.
On top of changes in players, the games
themselves have changed with time. There are
new elements in the trade game, for example,
such as the interaction between trade in ser-
vices, direct foreign investment and goods
trade. However, there has been no effort to date
7. Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Korea.
8. Here, Asia is defined as ASEAN + 6 as well as Taiwan
and Pakistan.
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to coordinate play in national policy-making in
these new parts of the trade game on optimal
equilibria; bilateral and multilateral treaties
have been the principal determinant of the
environment for international investment.
Likewise, in the macroeconomic coordination
game, high levels of financial intermediation
and risk management, accompanying the
growth of capital flows and the disappearance
of barriers to international capital mobility,
are a new source of potential macroeconomic
instability, and policies to govern this in an
internationally optimal way need to be negoti-
ated among developed as well as developing
economies.
The G20, by bringing the most important
emerging economies into the fold is thus best
thought of as an attempt to address these two
weaknesses in all the traditional coordination
devices simultaneously.
For this reason something like the G20
would eventually have been needed, even if it
had not been created when it was. As new
players enter international policy coordination
games and new issues affect the structure of
the games, there is a danger that old equilibria
will unravel, before play in the new expanded
games eventually converges on equilibria that
are Pareto inferior to the equilibria in the old
games. The G20 therefore aims to rehabilitate
the old institutions in the eyes of new players
in the game and reform these institutions as
necessary, so that they can continue to play
their role in coordinating and supporting equi-
libria. This is particularly important if it
turns out that the arrival of new players or the
emergence of new issues does in fact change
the policy games in such a way that old equi-
libria can no longer be stable and self-
enforcing. In this event, as policy-makers in
the world’s largest economies attempt to coor-
dinate on new equilibria through the G20 and
the other international institutions, it will be
important to remember that it will still only be
possible to move from inefficient equilibria in
repeated prisoners’ dilemma-like games to
Pareto-superior ones when the conditions of
the Folk Theorem hold, which in turn depends
on the players and the primitive game being
played.
4. What Has the G20 Done and What Is
to Be Done?
With this understanding of the nature of inter-
national institutions, and of the G20 in particu-
lar, it is now possible to evaluate the role of the
G20 and the priority that might attach to some
of the proposals for the G20’s immediate
agenda.
4.1 Macroeconomic Policy Coordination and
the Recovery
The first and, to this day still, most important
task of the G20 is resolving the financial crisis
and its economic consequences—particularly
the widening gap between capacity and effec-
tive demand, which has created an ongoing
risk of deflation and depression—and elimi-
nating the conditions that caused the crisis.9
Much of the G20’s efforts to resolve the crisis
have therefore focused on international coor-
dination of macroeconomic policies.
Macroeconomic policy-making presents
many of the same prisoners’ dilemma-like fea-
tures as trade policy; yet engineering a suc-
cessful transition to more efficient and stable
international institutions is much harder. The
fact that monetary and fiscal policy settings in
one country affect optimal monetary and fiscal
policy settings in other countries is a basic
result of open-economy macroeconomics. Just
as in the case of trade, this interdependence has
many of the characteristics of a prisoners’
dilemma, and the recognition of this type of
interdependence lay behind the creation of
another of the Bretton Woods institutions, the
IMF. While the IMF’s original purpose was
more limited—helping to preserve exchange-
rate stability—since the collapse of the dollar
standard it has more overtly moved into the
coordination of macroeconomic policies
generally.
Notwithstanding the existence of the IMF
and its goal of bringing about and support-
ing an international environment in which
Pareto-superior macroeconomic policies are
9. For a more detailed review of the achievements of the
G20 to date, see Pisani-Ferry (2011).
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followed, such policies have only partly pre-
vailed. One notable failure in recent times has
been the debate over external imbalances,
importantly between the United States and
East Asia, and between northern Europe and
southern Europe. These imbalances can be
seen as resulting from domestic macroeco-
nomic policies, and the IMF has been largely
powerless to stop them.
The G20 has met with some success in
reducing the partly policy-induced macroeco-
nomic imbalances that were associated with
the onset of the crisis. Notable successes in
this area was the Pittsburgh summit’s Frame-
work for Strong and Sustainable Growth,
which includes the Mutual Assessment
Process and the system of action plans that
subsequent summits have produced, and the
agreement at the Toronto summit on deficit
reduction targets to be reached by 2013, and
target debt to gross domestic product ratios for
2016. These measures need a common
approach to measuring progress of macroeco-
nomic policies against previous commitments,
taking changing economic circumstances into
account, if they are to be taken seriously. The
Los Cabos Accountability Assessment Frame-
work is a step in this direction, but only a step.
What reductions in imbalances that have taken
place—as between China and the United
States—appear more the result of changing
external economic circumstances than of any
deliberate policy intervention.
To understand the relative failure of interna-
tional policy cooperation in this area, one
needs to again relate the underlying game to
the Folk Theorem. Given that the conditions
for the theorem to hold appear again to be
satisfied—past actions are observable, the
probability of the game ending soon is suffi-
ciently low, the players are likely to be at least
somewhat patient—the reasons for failure
must therefore be sought elsewhere. What
appears to be missing in this context is a com-
prehensive system for punishing deviations
from cooperative policy setting, comparable to
the WTO’s dispute resolution body. As with
the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism, to
be effective, the punishment needs to be
carried out by countries themselves.
To illustrate this point, consider Atlanta Fed
President Dennis Lockhart’s recent comments
on the international dimension of US monetary
policy-making:
You have to remember that we are a legal creature
of Congress and that we only have a mandate to
concern ourselves with the interest of the United
States. Other countries simply have to take
that as a reality and adjust to us if that’s some-
thing important for their economies. (Bloomberg
2013)
These comments do not imply that US mon-
etary policy-makers take no account of the
effect of US monetary policy in other coun-
tries. However, they only take into account
those effects that in turn matter for the US
economy. Such feedback effects might be
purely mechanical: a tightening, say, of US
monetary policy might lead to a reduction in
capital flows to emerging economies and, con-
sequently, weaker demand for US exports in
these economies. If such general equilibrium
effects were sufficiently strong, then US
policy-makers would factor it into their
deliberations on when to taper quantitative
easing.
Yet such feedback could also arise from a
conscious decision of monetary policy-makers
in other countries affected by the Fed’s policy-
making, if other countries linked their own
monetary policy stance to whether the United
States has avoided imposing large costs on
them in its monetary policy setting. Thus, the
Fed would consider the effects of US monetary
policy on other countries, even if there were no
mechanical, general equilibrium effects for the
US economy.
The effectiveness of such an approach
would depend on two things. First, it would
require that monetary policy in the countries
concerned have a sufficiently large effect on
the US economy. Given the large trade and
investment flows between the United States
and the economies of the world’s next most
important currencies—the Euro, the Yen and
increasingly the Renminbi—this condition is
probably satisfied. Second, it would require
that other economies be willing, at least in
part, to use their monetary policy to enforce
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cooperative behaviour in monetary policy
setting between each other.
This is perhaps the problem—given the
large and indiscriminate effects of macroeco-
nomic policy changes, governments and
central banks are understandably reticent
about using macroeconomic policy to punish
other countries and their policy-makers. In
game-theoretical terms, the punishments used
to support the liberal trade regime, given the
more targeted nature of trade measures, could
conceivably dominate liberal trade policy,
from the policy-maker’s perspective, in the
one-shot game. It is not clear that this is
always the case when it comes to retaliatory
variations in the money supply or govern-
ment spending. Yet a way for countries to
retaliate in the face of deviations from agree-
ments to cooperate is needed if a cooperative
equilibrium can exist in the repeated game.
An international institution that, like the
IMF, purports to guarantee coordination of
macroeconomic policies can only coordinate
expectations to engineer a shift to a new equi-
librium, and sustain this equilibrium. It cannot
create an equilibrium that did not already
exist without it.
The G20 has certainly made some progress
in reforming the international financial institu-
tions to make them more representative of the
changing global economy and, thereby, better
able to fulfill their role in coordinating policy-
makers on globally optimal equilibria in
policy-making games. The Financial Stability
Forum has had its membership enlarged,
becoming the Financial Stability Board. An
agreement has also been reached on reform of
IMF quotas, but this reform has not yet been
properly implemented. US recalcitrance on
this matter is yet to be overcome, and the
leaders’ optimistic pledge at Los Cabos that it
would be passed in time for the Fund’s 2012
spring meetings was not honoured. But the
larger problem is still yet to be addressed, and
until the G20 can find acceptable punishment
strategies that allow countries to mutually
enforce Pareto-optimal equilibria in the mac-
roeconomic policy coordination game, macro-
economic policy will remain fundamentally
uncoordinated.
4.2 Infrastructure Investment and the
Recovery
At the time of the Seoul summit, the feeling
was that the worst of the crisis had passed and
the world could now turn to addressing less
pressing but important problems, such as
underdevelopment or food and energy secu-
rity. Since then, first the Euro crisis and then
civil war in Syria have overtaken the G20,
which finds itself both straddled with an ambi-
tious development agenda, set out in the Seoul
multi-year action plan and still faced with a
major international crisis which cries out for a
coordinated solution. The G20 needs to prove
itself up to managing the crisis by returning its
focus to international economic policy coordi-
nation to be able to persuade the global com-
munity that it can bring a conclusive end to the
current crisis.
Returning government budgets to surplus
and waiting for structural reforms to eliminate
disequilibria will take many years, and will
take longer the lower growth is in the short
run. And while emerging economies in Asia
and elsewhere have held up reasonably well
during the crisis, it is clear that these econo-
mies will suffer too if advanced economies do
not resume more rapid growth. The current
outlook for China is more uncertain than it
was, Indonesia’s growth is slowing and growth
in India is quite weak. There is need for rein-
forcing confidence via a concerted stimulus to
the global economy, and the G20 is the place
through which this can happen. Five years of
crisis mean that fiscal and monetary stimulus is
no longer possible to sustain for many G20
members, so another source of short-term eco-
nomic growth is needed.
Emerging economies are in a position to
increase domestic demand by investing a
greater part of their large savings at home
rather than abroad. The emphasis thus far has
been on expanding consumption. But investing
in infrastructure also presents a productive
opportunity for doing this (Elek 2011a). There
is a special opportunity to mobilise funds and
encourage structural reform to facilitate infra-
structure investment through the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank that China has
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proposed. This multi-pronged approach will
generate the needed synergies for greater long-
term jobs growth (Derviş and Drysdale 2014,
ch. 13).
The need for better infrastructure in emerg-
ing Asian countries is undeniable. With
booming populations in some countries (India,
Indonesia) and rapid urbanisation in all of
them, particularly China, existing infrastruc-
ture is inadequate. The Asian Development
Bank (ADB) has estimated that approximately
$8 trillion is needed in national infrastructure
in Asia between 2010 and 2020 alone (Asian
Development Bank 2009). This estimate does
not take account of the large demand for trans-
national infrastructure within the region and
on the drawing boards in regional agencies.10
The estimate of Asian infrastructure require-
ments stands next to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)’s estimate that global infrastructure
requirements over the next two decades will be
around $50 trillion (OECD 2011), highlighting
the importance of Asia in global infrastructure
demand.
There is a particular need for trans-border
regional infrastructure projects to connect the
disparate Asian economies. This will deepen
economic integration between rapidly growing
proximate economies and extend regional pro-
duction networks, allowing poorer countries in
the region to benefit more from the region’s
booming economies. The ADB (2009) has
estimated that $290 billion in spending is
needed on regional infrastructure projects on
top of the already identified national projects.
The most pressing focus is on connecting the
different Asian subregions, improving over-
land and sea links between South Asia, East
Asia and Southeast Asia. The importance of
these links is at the heart of Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Master
Plan on ASEAN Connectivity and recent work
of the Economic Research Institute for
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), which has
identified $390 billion of prospective projects
which would improve these links (ERIA
2010).
Not only would investing in infrastructure
stimulate activity in emerging economies, but
the long-run benefits would be large. The ratio
of capital to output in countries like China is
low (Elek 2011a), so the returns from investing
in infrastructure, the increase in productivity
of other factors of production and the increase
in output resulting from such investment, will
all therefore be high. Lower transport costs
across Asia and further integration of the Asian
economy will lead to further increases in Asian
output and growth.
Investing in infrastructure would also
provide a much-needed stimulus to developed
economies, one their governments are not cur-
rently in a position to deliver. The reasons for
this are discussed and reviewed by Lin and
Dömeland (2012), who estimate that 35
per cent of investment expenditure in develop-
ing economies goes towards capital goods
imported from advanced economies. These
imports largely consist of manufactured goods.
Given that the manufacturing sector in
advanced economies has been deeply affected
by the current crisis, there is spare capacity in
this sector to absorb an increase in demand
from emerging economies, so an increase in
demand will lead to little crowding-out of
existing activity.
Infrastructure investment in emerging
economies is therefore an ideal global stimu-
lus. It will lead to little crowding-out of exist-
ing or planned private activity in emerging and
developed economies, not only stimulating
activity in emerging economies in the short run
but also increasing their output in the long-run
too, as well as lifting capacity utilisation in
industrial economies.
In spite of the high social returns, there is a
shortage of private finance available for invest-
ment in infrastructure projects. Classic distor-
tions in goods and factor markets in emerging
economies are the first impediment to a better
allocation of savings. Fuel subsidies, corrupt
government officials, government monopolies
and the like all lower the private return from
investing in infrastructure well below the
social return.
The second impediment is the underdevel-
oped nature of capital markets in emerging10. See the list of prospective projects in ERIA (2010).
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Asia. Much of the large savings of these econo-
mies are intermediated through state-owned
banks, as in China, where they are not always
subject to market disciplines, or through finan-
cial institutions in advanced economies, which
are shy about investing in emerging economies.
The result of this is that Asian savings end up
fuelling the deficits of advanced economies
(Elek 2011b). In 2011, the ratio of debt to equity
in China’s foreign assets stood at 8.2, India’s
was at 2.6 and Indonesia’s was 3.4. This com-
pared with a ratio of 0.7 for Australia or 0.9 for
New Zealand (Lane 2013).
This leads to the third impediment, namely
that infrastructure projects in emerging econo-
mies are not always attractive investments for
financiers, even when the returns are high.
Physical infrastructure is a very illiquid asset,
and returns take time to come. Investors are
also turned away by perceived risks in emerg-
ing economies stemming from poor regulation,
governance or macroeconomic policies. While
these impediments make for a powerful and
stifling combination, they are problems that
can all be fixed.
Although the reforms needed to overcome
the impediments to expanded infrastructure
investment in emerging economies are largely
domestic, the G20 needs to make them its
concern for the sake of the global economy.
There is a complement between prosecuting
this agenda regionally (in APEC) and in the
G20 (Derviş and Drysdale 2014, ch. 13). The
stimulus from increased demand for exports of
capital goods from advanced economies is just
what the world economy needs to ride out the
difficult process of structural adjustment in
Europe and in the United States (Elek 2012).
Finding an alternative use for emerging econo-
mies’ savings is also an integral part of the
G20’s task of rebalancing the global economy.
In the context of the modus operandi of the
G20 discussed above, where officials of differ-
ent countries share policy experience, officials
from advanced economies would have much to
contribute to help emerging economies remove
the impediments to more market-based invest-
ment in infrastructure.
Some good work has been done through the
G20 to promote infrastructure investment, but
not enough. The multi-year action plan on
development agreed to at the Seoul summit
saw the creation of a high-level panel on infra-
structure, made up of businessmen and private
financiers. They collaborated with a working
group from the multilateral development
banks to ‘[overcome] obstacles to infrastruc-
ture financing’,11 with particular reference to
low income countries. Two complementary
reports were presented to the Cannes summit,
one by the working group, one by the panel
addressing these problems.
The report of the panel and the multilateral
development banks’ action plan contained
some useful analysis of the obstacles to greater
private financing of infrastructure projects and
some helpful suggestion to overcome these. But
the focus of the groups’ terms of reference on
low income countries, particularly sub-Saharan
Africa, was too narrow. While that region unde-
niably needs better infrastructure, the report
highlighted that many African countries cur-
rently lack the capacity to develop large proj-
ects to a stage where they can attract private
finance. In addition, the contribution to growth
of infrastructure projects in Africa would likely
be less important to global recovery than those
in Asia, as low population densities and lower
incomes would mean a smaller scale of, and a
lower return on, investment. Not only was the
focus of the reports too narrow, but the recom-
mendations more relevant to middle-income
countries have not yet been implemented, par-
ticularly the launch of a global infrastructure
benchmarking initiative and improving incen-
tives for staff of development banks to engage
in public-private partnerships (PPPs) and
develop regional projects.12
Independently of the G20, Asian countries
have already started to address their infrastruc-
ture needs. Regional funds, including the
recently launched ASEAN Infrastructure
Fund, which has funding of $485 million
a year from ASEAN governments and the
ADB, or the Asian Infrastructure Financ-
ing Initiative, which brings together several
11. 2010 Seoul multi-year action plan on development.
12. See the 2012 progress report of the G20 Development
Working Group.
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development banks in the region, are aimed at
increasing the funding for regional projects.
There are also regional initiatives to increase
private funding, notably the ASEAN+3 Bond
Market Initiative, a collaborative initiative
with the ADB which aims to improve capital
markets. The Chinese Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank initiative potentially adds to
the pool. These initiatives do not, however,
address the distortions or the institutional and
regulatory deficiencies which are keeping
more private finance from being invested in
infrastructure projects. Here, the experience of
the developed G20 economies could prove
invaluable.
By sharing their policy experience, leaders
and policy-makers within the G20 group are
equipped to identify and remedy existing fail-
ings in regulation and governance as well as
distortions in product and factors markets.
This will only happen if the G20 concentrates
more specifically on infrastructure investment,
not as merely one component of a develop-
ment agenda that will always be sidelined by
macroeconomic developments. The G20 needs
to recognise the importance of infrastructure
as the source of growth, both in the short and
medium term, an element in global recovery
that cannot be delivered without deep struc-
tural reform and which the global economy
urgently needs.
4.3 Climate Change
There is another policy-game where the exist-
ing international institutional structure has
largely failed to coordinate play on Pareto-
superior equilibrium, and this is taking policy
action to avert climate change. Assuming
countries actually want to limit the extent of
climate change, all would arguably prefer the
outcome in which all mitigate emissions to the
one in which no one does. However, because
mitigating emissions is costly, countries would
be even better off free riding on other coun-
tries’ efforts to reduce emissions. And since
mitigation in one major country is only effec-
tive if all or most major countries mitigate their
emissions, no country is willing to unilaterally
reduce emissions. Thus, the equilibrium is for
no country to mitigate, even if this is Pareto
inferior to all mitigating, and climate change
mitigation is another prisoners’ dilemma-type
situation.
Again, the conditions of the Folk Theorem
appear to be fulfilled, yet the relevant interna-
tional institution in this area of policy, the
UNFCCC, through the annual conferences of
the parties and the negotiation of agreements,
has largely proven unsuccessful in coordinat-
ing expectations in such a way that the equi-
librium shifts from one in which no or few
large countries mitigate emissions, to one in
which nearly all do so. What limited policies
countries have enacted to lower the likelihood
of large-scale climate change either by reduc-
ing their emissions, as in the case of Europe, or
at least the carbon intensity of their economies,
as in the case of China, has been the fruit of
unilateral action. Yet, as argued above, all
countries would probably still prefer a situa-
tion in which all major emitters went further in
their attempts to reduce emissions of green-
house gases.
Two points can be made in connection with
greenhouse-gas-reduction game. First, as
always, it is important to remember which
countries are involved in the game. Again, only
the policy actions of the largest economies
matter in this respect. This is not to deny that
the effects of global warming will be most
harshly felt in many of the world’s smallest
and poorest economies. But if the objective is
to get major emitters to coordinate a move to
low-emissions equilibrium, this will be easier
the fewer extra countries are involved. In this
respect, the G20, although it has made few
concrete statements about reducing green-
house gas emissions so far, has a major advan-
tage over the UNFCCC, in that the major
emitters, and only them, are present in the
G20.
Second, any attempt to move to a new high-
emissions-reduction equilibrium between the
major emitters must make sure that what is
proposed is indeed an equilibrium of the
repeated game. This requires not only that the
commitments of major emitters be specified,
but also that credible punishments, to be
carried out by the parties to the agreement, be
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specified in the event that a country does not
meet its commitments. Those devising any
such agreement should again look to the opera-
tion of the WTO for an example of successful
credible punishments.
To be clear, this does not mean that coun-
tries engaging in efforts to reduce greenhouse
gases now should feel justified in adopting
trade sanctions against countries not already
taking similar action. However, once the coun-
tries involved do have an agreement about
greenhouse-gas reductions, it would be reason-
able, even essential, for the agreement to
specify what kind of sanctions one party will
impose on another in the event the agreement
is breached. To lower the likelihood that agree-
ments are breached by accident, it also seems
reasonable that any such agreement be focused
on inputs to emissions reductions, such as the
creation of emissions trading schemes, over
which policy-makers have direct control.
Agreements that focus on outputs, namely the
amount by which emissions are to be reduced,
will be more subject to chance variations in
external conditions in determining whether
they are satisfied or not. Focusing on outputs
was a flaw of the Kyoto protocol, which led for
example to Japan’s withdrawing from the pro-
tocol, in part because a natural disaster,
leading to the abandonment of nuclear power,
made it impossible for that country to meet its
targets.
5. Conclusion: The G20 in Future
While the activities and objectives of the G20,
and international institutions in general, are
often debated in both academic circles and
non-academic circles, no previous effort has
been made to relate international institutions to
the existing economic theory of institutions.
This essay has attempted to address this by
applying the game-theoretical analysis of
institutions to the international institutional
architecture.
This approach has focused the attention on
primitive policy-making games. In these
repeated games, the Folk Theorem guarantees,
under certain conditions, that Pareto optimal
equilibria exist and may be supported by strat-
egies that punish defections. Throughout the
article, we study, without pretension of
exhaustiveness, three policy-making games:
trade policy, macroeconomic policy and
climate policy.
In each of these areas of policy-making, we
have identified an international institution that
attempts to coordinate expectations of policy-
makers around Pareto-efficient equilibria:
WTO in the case of trade, IMF for macroeco-
nomic policy and the UNFCCC for climate
change. In carrying out this analysis, the
importance and difficulty of finding acceptable
punishment strategies has been highlighted,
particularly in the macroeconomic policy-
making and climate change games.
In each of these games, the economic rise of
Asia is a shock to the games previously only
played between the advanced economies.
These new players to the game have not always
accepted the equilibria on which existing inter-
national institutions have until now attempted
to coordinate expectations. The formation of
the G20 can be seen at least in part as a
response to this.
The formation of the G20 represents a major
achievement, perhaps even the most important
achievement of international diplomacy in
recent times. The focus of the G20 to date has
been almost exclusively on domestic economic
policy; countries have brought forward and
debated each other’s policies. They have
examined them through the lens of their poli-
cies’ effects on growth and employment in
other countries before reaching decisions and
then, in a spirit of mutually beneficial coopera-
tion, followed up those decisions with inde-
pendent action. This domestic focus, and this
modus operandi—where countries agree on
domestic policies but the responsibility for
implementing them lies exclusively with the
respective countries—is part of the strength of
the G20. The alternative, to expect the G20
countries to bind themselves to a grand bargain
which will solve all the international problems
of the day, would only lead to stalemate and
deadlock.
Beyond immediate domestic policy coordi-
nation and crisis management, there is still a
need to address the entrance of new countries
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in policy-making games previously only
played between established industrial coun-
tries. This will require either involving them in
the current equilibria of the game, quintessen-
tially represented by the WTO system of trade
liberalisation, or finding ways to collectively
coordinate on new equilibria. The main
strength of the G20 is that it brings together the
new and old participants in the coordination
games analysed, and only them, and therefore
offers them an opportunity to agree on how
best to use and adapt the international institu-
tional architecture to coordinate on Pareto-
optimal equilibria.
The emerging Asian economies have ben-
efited enormously from the existing rules of
the game, but, as their importance continues to
grow over the coming years and decades, they
must be better included in the international
rules-setting organisations. The emergence of
new issues that affect the structure of the
games through welfare-improving equilibria is
another element that has highlighted the limi-
tations of the existing regime. The creation of
the G20 has begun to address both these
shocks to the global economic system, and that
is why it represents such an important change
in global governance. But the process of
adjusting the division of international power to
better reflect international economic weight
has only begun, and many important reforms
to international institutions remain to be done.
July 2014.
This article is based on a paper prepared for
the inaugural Asia and the Pacific Policy
Society Conference, held in Canberra on 7–8
September 2012.
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